Long-term memory enables persistent personalization in LLM agents, but repeated memory-conditioned responses can cumulatively reveal protected attributes even when they are never stated explicitly. We formalize this threat as adaptive transcript privacy and introduce DP-MemView, a differentially private interface that privately selects public response-conditioning views and exposes those views---rather than raw memory---to the response LLM. Each private selection is charged to every protected attribute whose memory group intersects the read set. Per-attribute ledgers block any selection that would exceed its cap and return a fixed generic view instead. Under an explicit interface contract, we prove pure B_a-DP for the entire adaptive transcript. We also extend the result to stores that differ across multiple protected groups and bound how much observing the transcript can change an adversary's prior odds. We evaluate the online and preallocated modes with three response LLMs on a controlled adjacent-store benchmark and a public-corpus transfer track. Both modes keep transcript distinguishability near chance while preserving target-required personalization and overall response quality. Further diagnostics show that removing key safeguards causes mismatched output support, missing ledger charges, revealing side channels, or growing long-horizon leakage.
This paper proposes EP-Mem, an Elastic Privacy Memory architecture that reframes privacy as user-owned boundary control across social roles, and constructs EP-Bench, to the authors' knowledge the first long-term multi-party benchmark with cross-session correlated events for policy-conditioned relational disclosure.
Feng-Zhou Sun, Yuan Zhang, Xin-Tong Yu et al.· 0 citations
Long-term memory enables personalized conversational agents to retain user information across sessions. However, existing memory architectures primarily optimize for utility while neglecting the risks of unnecessarily storing and reusing private attributes such as personally identifiable information (PII). Addressing p...
Wen-Jie Wang, Wen-He Si, Xin-Yue Xu et al.· 1 citation
Long-term-memory agents can retrieve relevant information that is inadmissible for the current request because it belongs to another principal, violates policy, or reflects an incompatible lifecycle state. Recall and final-answer accuracy do not reveal this: a route can appear safe by missing required evidence, while a...
Zi Wang, Xing-Qiao Wang, Emmanuel Addai et al.· 0 citations
Control evaluations reveal that targeted poisoning risk varies across memory operations and motivate stage-aware evaluation and control of LLM-agent memory, showing that targeted poisoning risk varies across memory operations.
Chuan-Chao Zang, Zi-Jian Cao, Xiang-Tao Meng et al.· 0 citations
Privacy exposure displacement, the mismatch between a local evaluation proxy and target-grounded session exposure, and ASLEval, an authorization-aware framework that pre-registers a hidden target set, measures all declared visible exits, and reserves internal traces for diagnosis are introduced.
Guo-Xin Wu, Hui-Zhen Huang, Guo-Xiong Long et al.· 0 citations
Persistent memory can improve personalization in LLM agents but can also induce sycophancy and cross-domain leakage. We distinguish two governance decisions: admission, which determines what recalled information enters the working context, and presentation, which determines how admitted information is expressed. We imp...
Chang Liu, De-Liang Ding· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.