Regret matching+ (RM+) is parameter free, scale invariant, and central to large game solving, but its only general individual-regret guarantee grows as $\sqrt{T}$. A recent ICLR result used this envelope to prove that RM+ reaches an $\epsilon$-stationary point of a smooth objective over a product of simplices in $O(\epsilon^{-4})$ iterations, or $O(\epsilon^{-8})$ from the standard zero initialization. We give an exact one-step conservation law for RM+. It states that forward utility gain pays for both squared state motion and growth of the regret-state norm. Norm growth is at most $\sqrt{m-1}$ times forward gain for $m$ actions, and the coefficient is sharp. This yields four results for unmodified RM+. Its regret on any utility path is controlled by centered temporal variation. Its regret is uniformly bounded under alternating play in every finite exact potential game, resolving an open question and making squared activation gaps summable. Both certified lazy and ordinary cyclic play attain an $\epsilon^{-2}$ exponent. On any smooth, possibly nonconcave simplex objective, RM+ finds an $\epsilon$-KKT point in $O(\epsilon^{-2})$ iterations. Most broadly, for a smooth objective over an arbitrary product of simplices, cyclic block RM+ attains the same $O(\epsilon^{-2})$ exponent from arbitrary initialization, with an explicit trajectory-dependent constant. The proof controls the finite objective loss caused by low-state blocks and then self-bounds every block state and the total squared path length. Complete proofs cover zero states, sharpness, common-profile stationarity, and robust gain dominance. Oracle-normalized diagnostics compare RM+ with predictive and smooth extra-gradient variants on graphical potential games and dense nonconvex objectives.
We study last-iterate convergence in unknown two-player zero-sum matrix games with bandit payoff feedback and observed opponent actions. For games with $d$ actions per player, we develop an algorithm achieving a duality gap of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{d/t})$ with high probability, simultaneously at every round $t...
The regret attainable in online convex optimization when access to the feasible set is limited to an exact linear optimization oracle is characterized and a curvature-dependent lower bound is identified above which the general characterization remains sharp.
Can simple no-regret dynamics attain smaller regret in self-play than against arbitrary adversaries? In $n$-player general-sum games, Daskalakis et al. 2021 proved an $O(n\log d_i\log^4 T)$ individual regret bound for Optimistic Hedge, which improves upon the classical $O(\sqrt T)$ adversarial regret bound. In this wor...
This work builds on the variable-metric framework of Sakaue et al., adding a self-normalized rank-one update, and replaces the $\log\det$ potential by the trace power $\tr(H^{-1/2})$, which is bounded outright and removes the $\ln T$.
Yang Cai, Anupam Gupta, Vineet Gupta et al.· 3 citations· ⚡1
This work introduces \emph{ECHO-OFTRL}: optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) equipped with an EMA cascade for high-order optimism (ECHO), where EMA denotes exponential moving average, and leverages a new form of optimism inspired by modern filter design.
Mingyang Liu, Gabriele Farina, A. Ozdaglar· 6 citations· ⚡4
No prior is needed at all: a random-marginal probing algorithm reading neither the scale $m$, nor the concavity-envelope exponent $\beta$ of Blum, Garicano, Ravichandran and Sharma, nor the horizon $T, achieves the optimal $\Theta(k^{\beta/(1+\beta)}+k/T)$ simultaneously for every $\beta$ and every horizon.
Xuan-Jun Li· 0 citations
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