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PolyFlow is a neural-symbolic framework for statically reasoning about information flow across language boundaries, combining large language models (LLMs) and static analysis synergistically, and is cost-effective and superior to various kinds of state-of-the-art baselines.
Software vulnerabilities are persistent, but validating them remains difficult: a Proof-of-Vulnerability (PoV) requires a concrete input that triggers the vulnerable behavior, yet public triggering inputs are often unavailable for disclosed vulnerabilities. Existing techniques make different tradeoffs in effectiveness, scalability, cost, and controllability, leaving room for complementary designs. To complement them, we present POVGEN, a low-cost neuro-symbolic framework that makes PoV generation cost-effective via semantic focusing and LLM-guided constraint reasoning using open-weight models. POVGEN first localizes vulnerability-relevant regions (utilizing patch information if available), then performs path-sensitive reachability analysis, and finally generates PoVs by extracting and solving constraints with LLM-guided reasoning backed by an SMT solver. POVGEN successfully generates PoVs for 78.98% of vulnerabilities in a recent benchmark, outperforming fuzzing (up to 50.20%) and symbolic execution (2.45%). On 250 real-world CVEs without public PoVs, it generates valid PoVs for 74.80% of cases and reproduces 65.1% when without patch information. The fine-tuned open-weight models match frontier commercial LLMs on key sub-tasks (i.e., the core constraint-reasoning steps) while running locally at no per-sample API cost. Applying the generated PoVs revealed six flawed patches in disclosed CVEs (all subsequently fixed) and five previously unreported vulnerabilities (of which four have been confirmed and fixed by the developers).
Many software systems expose multiple execution modes through command-line options, subcommands, and configuration flags. For such programs, fuzzing depends on both mutated inputs and the invoked mode. Yet evaluations still focus on coverage and bug counts, leaving unclear how execution modes partition, overlap, and miss software structure, and how these differences affect effectiveness. We present an empirical study of software structure under multi-driver fuzzing. We propose a structural abstraction that uses a static call graph as a shared backbone and projects driver-specific dynamic coverage onto it to derive driver-induced subgraphs. Based on this abstraction, we develop a four-phase methodology for backbone construction, fuzzing and profiling, graph-based analysis, and research-question-driven evaluation. We apply it to 27 OSS-Fuzz-derived C/C++ projects, spanning 43 executables and 854 driver configurations. Under the same total budget, multi-driver fuzzing outperforms the best single-driver baseline, increasing covered call-graph nodes by 27.9% and CFG-edge coverage by 73.5%, and revealing 11 unique bugs and abnormal behaviors largely missed by single-driver fuzzing. However, driver contributions are uneven, subgraphs differ substantially in cohesion, fragmentation, modularity, overlap, and residual under-exploration follows recurring regimes rather than a homogeneous tail. These results show that multi-driver fuzzing is fundamentally a structural exploration problem.