Practical QKD modulators introduce correlations between consecutively emitted pulses due to bandwidth limitations, violating key assumptions underlying many security proof techniques. Here, we address this problem by introducing a simple yet powerful mathematical framework to directly extend phase-error-estimation-base...
A simple finite-key security proof based on phase-error estimation for prepare-and-measure QKD in the presence of either a priori information leakage about the basis choices and/or a posteriori information leakage about the measurement outcomes is presented.
Álvaro Navarrete, Margarida Pereira, Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo et al.· 0 citations
This work proposes a QKD source that is intrinsically robust against side-channel attacks, and under idealized source assumptions commonly adopted in proposals for existing schemes, conventional decoy-state security analyses apply directly, yielding substantially higher key rates.
Kiyoshi Tamaki, M. Curty, Akihiro Mizutani et al.· 0 citations
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