A simple finite-key security proof based on phase-error estimation for prepare-and-measure QKD in the presence of either a priori information leakage about the basis choices and/or a posteriori information leakage about the measurement outcomes is presented.
Abstract
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) receivers may leak information about their measurement outcomes and settings to the channel (e.g., through detector backflashes or back-reflected Trojan-horse light) that could compromise the protocol's security. Here we present a simple finite-key security proof based on phase-error estimation for prepare-and-measure QKD in the presence of either a priori information leakage about the basis choices and/or a posteriori information leakage about the measurement outcomes. The proof requires only a bound on the distinguishability of the side-channel states. Furthermore, the analysis is modular and compatible with existing security proofs that address detector and source imperfections, making it applicable to a wide range of practical QKD implementations.
Practical QKD modulators introduce correlations between consecutively emitted pulses due to bandwidth limitations, violating key assumptions underlying many security proof techniques. Here, we address this problem by introducing a simple yet powerful mathematical framework to directly extend phase-error-estimation-base...
It is shown that general post-selective soft-filtering transformations of side-channel states can be consistently incorporated into the GLLP and Koashi framework, and a Holevo-based upper bound on the eavesdropper's information for decoy-state BB84 is derived.
I. Sushchev, Kirill Bugai, D. Bulavkin et al.· AVS Quantum Science· 0 citations
This work presents a security proof for generic prepare-and-measure QKD protocols, including decoy-state BB84, with imperfect and imperfectly characterized sources and detectors using the marginal-constrained entropy accumulation theorem (MEAT).
Jerome Wiesemann, John Burniston, Devashish Tupkary et al.· 0 citations
By endowing the minimal-detector receiver of polarization QKD with a conclusive, loss-robust disturbance alarm, the solution lowers the hardware entry cost of security-monitored QKD, hence fostering its adoption at the cost-sensitive network edge.
Gaussian-modulated coherent-state (GMCS) continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) offers a practical path to quantum-secured communication owing to its compatibility with existing optical fibre networks and use of mature security proofs. Achieving high secret key rates in real-time systems, however, re...
Adam Alderton, Amanda Weerasinghe, Muataz Alhussein et al.· npj Quantum Information· 0 citations
We study quantum-state oblivious transfer over the quantum erasure channel under information-theoretic security guarantees. Specifically, Alice holds two quantum systems, Bob wishes to recover one of them, and the parties have access to independent channel uses and authenticated public classical communication, with no...
Re-Mi A. Chou· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.
