Proof-Carrying Contracts (PC2) is introduced, a framework for making agreed constraints enforceable throughout an agent's interactions with a system and provides a foundation for an agent economy whose agreements protect both those delegating work and those carrying it out.
C. Ciliberto, Alessandro Rudi, E. Tassi· 0 citations
The proposed SUA-Arena, which implements 6 attack strategies and contains 188 test cases, finds that all of them are vulnerable to show-up attacks and shows that multi-agent systems need explicit mechanisms for enforcing authority boundaries.
Mao-Sen Zhang, Jian-Shuo Dong, Yu-Tong Zhang et al.· 0 citations
The results show that task capability, additional reasoning, and consequence-oriented safety evaluation do not by themselves ensure authorization alignment, pointing to a tension between agent autonomy and preserving users'decision authority that calls for further human-centered study.
Zhi-Ping Zhang, Franklin Mingzhe Li, Zi-Hao Huang et al.· 1 citation
Generative models for deepfakes have rapidly evolved from GAN-based architectures to diffusion models and multimodal large language models (MLLMs). However, empirical research on human performance in detecting deepfake face images has not kept pace. It remains unclear if (and how) detection performance varies across ge...
Zhiqing Guo, Lixin Jia, Luning Sun et al.· 0 citations
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This first comprehensive analysis of consent and data collection practices across 10,000+ mHealth apps on the Google Play Store is presented, combining static analysis and privacy policy examination, with a rigorous operational definition to distinguish health apps from general wellness programs, and a measurement fram...
Ethan Myers, Lorenzo De Carli, Shantanu Sharma et al.· 0 citations
Transferable attacks allow adversarial manipulations or learned attack mechanisms constructed in one setting to compromise other AI systems, potentially reducing attack costs and amplifying security and privacy risks. Yet fragmented terminology and evaluation practices hinder understanding of what transfers, why it tra...
Guangjing Wang, Ce Zhou, Yuanda Wang et al.· 0 citations
Red teaming must continually adapt as frontier LLM safeguards evolve, yet existing approaches largely search for adversarial prompts or optimize within fixed attack procedures. We observe that even when an attack becomes ineffective, its underlying mechanisms can remain useful and can be revised or recombined to constr...
Zhouyuan Ma, Yutao Wu, Hanxun Huang et al.· 0 citations
This work proposes ECHO (Evaluation-Conditioned Harmfulness Optimization), which replaces the compliance proxy with response-level, continuous harmfulness scores from HarmSig, a 1.7B regressor grounded in actual harmful capability.
Yuan-Wei Wu, Ling-Dong Huang, Yun-Long Mao et al.· 0 citations
SAFE-Mem is a fine-grained memory governance framework that improves security while preserving legitimate memory use and attains the lowest attack success among defenses that retain legitimate memory, at least 77% below the strongest of them, and the highest answer accuracy of all evaluated defenses.
Hao-Ming Li, Ding-Yi Kang, Xue Hu et al.· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly process sensitive documents and personal information, yet sending prompts containing personally identifiable information (PII) to remote providers exposes data subjects and organizations to risks from logging, retention, model training, and unintended disclosure. Existing anony...
Mohamed Elmahallawy, M. Shaaban, Thomas E. Carroll· 0 citations
Methods for training language models on sensitive data differ in how they balance capability gains against the risk of leaking private information. In this paper, we present a controlled comparison of data-level and training-level interventions for navigating the capability-privacy tradeoff on synthetic medical records...
Zihao Zhao, Avi Schwarzschild, Casey Meehan et al.· 0 citations
Tool-using agents read untrusted external content, which exposes them to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions hijack the agent's tool calls. Benchmarks measure IPI security by the attack success rate (ASR), which treats every failed attack as a successful defense. To test this assumption, we audit...
Farhan Zarif, Kazi Shahid Ahmed Galib, Synthia Akter Promi et al.· 0 citations
Research Manager Mike Walker reflects on a career spanning hacker culture, cybersecurity, and AI, sharing lessons about trust, teamwork, leadership, and why solving difficult problems requires curiosity, judgment, agility—and an understanding of the rules. The post Learn the rules: The hacker mindset appeared first on Microsoft Research.
Critical flaws, compromised release channels and agentic AI threats landed within days of each other in mid-October 2026. Why “Black October” may say more about how well we now find weaknesses than about the attacks themselves. The post Black October? The Week AI Changed the Cybersecurity Conversation appeared first on GPT-Lab.