An interpretable temporal-logic rule miner is used to recover a portable Fragment-EH rule that the protocol reveals to be a within-packet, near-definitional co-occurrence rather than a temporal pattern, so the temporal-logic machinery does no work for this dominant rule.
Priyankar Sinha, Nikolaos Kekatos, Stylianos Basagiannis et al.· 1 citation
Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) remains vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing LLM backdoors are almost all input-centric: activation depends on explicit trigger patterns in the user input, so modern guardrails are built to sanitize the input space. We challenge this assumption with a novel answer-si...
Yi-Bo Zhang, Tian-Rong Guan, Liang Lin et al.· Conference on Empirical Meth...· 0 citations
The combination of increasing connectivity to the outside world and the lack of inbuilt security mechanisms has made legacy intra-vehicular networks extremely vulnerable to cyberattacks. Consequently, significant research has been devoted to analysing the impact of potential attacks, yielding datasets crucial for devel...
Shashwat Khandelwal, Shreejith Shanker· ACM Transactions on Embedded...· 0 citations
IAM policy analysis typically emphasizes the authorization capabilities encoded in a policy, but security analyst review priority may also depend on the behavioral and environmental context surrounding a policy event. This paper evaluates whether contextual information provides measurable incremental value for interpre...
Yassin Elsharkawy· 0 citations
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Enterprise AI agents that share a memory store face two unaddressed risks: sensitive data can leak through legitimately computed results the requester could not derive, and departments can silently compute a same-named key performance indicator (KPI) through conflicting logic. Existing agent-memory systems (e.g., MemGP...
While open-weight models have enjoyed steady progress in capabilities and wide adoption across multiple domains, their safety remains an important concern. One key feature is the ability to refuse or deflect harmful, malicious, or insensitive prompts. In this paper, we expose safety vulnerabilities across six common op...
A. Dubey, Scott Sirri, Vaggos Chatziafratis et al.· 0 citations
LLM agents increasingly act in multi-actor environments, exposing them to misuse from multiple sources: decomposition attacks, where a harmful request is split into innocuous sub-requests, and prompt injection attacks, where a compromised tool delivers a malicious instruction. Existing evaluations treat these threats s...
Aniruddh Pramod, James Oldfield, Adel Bibi· 0 citations
Image-to-text jailbreaks place harmful intent in text, image content, or the relationship between them. We examine image-side factors across four published attack families on a 313-prompt StrongREJECT slice, using five multimodal models and an additional appendix evaluation of InternVL3.5-8B. The harmful instruction is...
Bo-Yuan Chen, Yehia Dawoud, Hailemariam Mersha et al.· 0 citations
We audit frequency and decoder-depth claims for AdvWave-P, an additive audio jailbreak, on Qwen2-Audio. The protocol masks frequency components of the perturbation in the short-time Fourier transform (STFT) domain and measures attack success and audio-span representations. On 520 AdvBench prompts, the primary judge lab...
Boyuan Chen, Minseok Kim, Sohaila Abdulsattar et al.· 0 citations
The first theoretical analysis explaining why latent-based watermarking methods intrinsically exhibit limited robustness is provided, and a maximum perturbation bound is derived that characterizes the relationship between pixel-space perturbations and their corresponding effects in latent space.
Cheng-Han Yeh, Kuan-Chun Yu, Cheng-Chang Tsai et al.· 0 citations
In this paper, we show that standard evaluations of high-resolution Model Inversion Attacks (MIAs) significantly underestimate training-data privacy leakage. State-of-the-art privacy defenses, standard training techniques such as MixUp and Adversarial Training, and undefended models all leak training images at rates 1....
Shailen Smith, Rasmus Torp, Adam Breuer· 0 citations
TRACE is introduced, a weights-only auditing method that localizes an unknown checkpoint update relative to frozen harmful and non-harmful reference prototypes and converts this geometry into a continuous harmful-objective score.
Zi-Qun Bao, Xin-Yu Zhang, Yu-Chen Shao et al.· 0 citations
Research Manager Mike Walker reflects on a career spanning hacker culture, cybersecurity, and AI, sharing lessons about trust, teamwork, leadership, and why solving difficult problems requires curiosity, judgment, agility—and an understanding of the rules. The post Learn the rules: The hacker mindset appeared first on Microsoft Research.
Critical flaws, compromised release channels and agentic AI threats landed within days of each other in mid-October 2026. Why “Black October” may say more about how well we now find weaknesses than about the attacks themselves. The post Black October? The Week AI Changed the Cybersecurity Conversation appeared first on GPT-Lab.