The challenge for the law shifts from detecting and remedying algorithmic discrimination to governing agent-mediated anonymity as civil rights infrastructure: ensuring access to privacy-preserving agents, regulating abuse without forced identification, and deciding whether retailers may refuse to deal with agents at all.
Abstract
Artificial intelligence agents can transact online on behalf of a human principal---browsing, paying, receiving, and reviewing---without revealing who that principal is. That architecture starves algorithmic discrimination of its inputs---identity, purchase history, location history, behavioral traces, and demographic proxies---but also forecloses its proof. Disparate-treatment needs comparators; disparate-impact needs protected-class baselines; and *Iqbal*-era pleading needs specific factual allegations---doctrinal predicates that anonymous transactions never generate. The effects fall asymmetrically: those most vulnerable to discrimination are least able to afford the shield and, when harms remain, least able to prove them. The challenge for the law shifts from detecting and remedying algorithmic discrimination to governing agent-mediated anonymity as civil rights infrastructure: ensuring access to privacy-preserving agents, regulating abuse without forced identification, and deciding whether retailers may refuse to deal with agents at all.
PRIMUS, which couples prime-power identity with BLS aggregate signatures (PIAC), derives a safe-kill threshold that reduces false-positive agent termination from 80% to 0.00% under 10% channel noise, gives the closed-form economic boundary where singleton governance outperforms Byzantine quorum, and specifies VRF succe...
It is argued that agent security must be evaluated under an untrusted-model assumption: a correct system is one in which a fully prompt-injected agent still cannot exceed the authority explicitly delegated to it, and an authorization broker is implemented that closes the gap.
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An integrative review of the four literatures the discipline of computational jurisprudence must synthesize, namely, object-capability security; verifiable, proof-carrying, and zero-knowledge computation; policy-as-code and computational law; and agentic AI with its emerging payment protocols.
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A leakage analysis of each projection is given, an incident in which a first-cut projection preserved the identifier it was written to remove is reported, and the residual trust the design does not eliminate is given.
The framework strategic interactive oversight (SIO), which treats oversight jointly as a verification mechanism and a strategic communication channel, is introduced and the notion of task-admissible latent optimisation is formalised, which entails the pursuit of latent objectives while maintaining a prescribed task per...
Rayne Holland, Li-Ming Zhu, Jason Xue· 0 citations
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