May 2026· arXiv.org· Vol abs/2605.16436· 0 citations· 82 references
Computer Science
TL;DR
The Infinite Impostor is introduced, an attack model in which an autonomous agent interposes itself between two parties who already trust each other, hijacking an existing relationship rather than building a new one from scratch, and the governance tensions that arise when platforms become the regulatory substrate of digital interaction.
Abstract
For decades, the security of digital interaction has rested on an unacknowledged economic constraint. Attackers faced a tradeoff between the fidelity of a deception and the scale at which it could be deployed. Convincing impersonation required sustained human effort and was confined to a narrow set of high-value targets, while mass-market attacks sacrificed plausibility for reach. Detection systems, verification mechanisms, and user awareness training have all been implicitly calibrated to the artifacts of cheap deception that this tradeoff produced. Agentic AI collapses the tradeoff, allowing high-fidelity, individually tailored deception to be produced at mass-market scale. We argue that this shift exhausts a security paradigm rather than merely intensifying the threat landscape. We introduce the Infinite Impostor, an attack model in which an autonomous agent interposes itself between two parties who already trust each other, hijacking an existing relationship rather than building a new one from scratch. Detection-oriented defenses share an assumption that generative progress is eliminating, that synthetic outputs are distinguishable from authentic ones. We propose a suspect-by-default paradigm that shifts security from authenticating actors to evaluating actions, and examine the governance tensions that arise when platforms become the regulatory substrate of digital interaction.
CWE-bench is introduced, a private benchmark of 120 held-out repository audit-and-repair tasks spanning 73 CWE types, eight languages, and all OWASP Top 10 2025 categories, showing that no single agent is best across languages or vulnerability categories, and difficulty varies far more by vulnerability category than by...
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The framework strategic interactive oversight (SIO), which treats oversight jointly as a verification mechanism and a strategic communication channel, is introduced and the notion of task-admissible latent optimisation is formalised, which entails the pursuit of latent objectives while maintaining a prescribed task per...
Rayne Holland, Li-Ming Zhu, Jason Xue· 0 citations
Attackers profit from what defenders do not understand. Software security has treated the gap between system behavior and human comprehension as a condition to narrow through analysis and assurance, booking the remainder as accepted risk. Agentic AI systems change that gap: when software reads, writes, explains, and au...
Existing safety frameworks of artificial intelligence (AI) systems largely treat alignment as a static optimization problem (e.g., tuning models to desired behavior) while overlooking the dynamic, adversarial incentives that shape how data are collected, how models are evaluated, and how they are ultimately deployed. W...
Cheol Woo Kim, Davin Choo, Tzeh Yuan Neoh et al.· IEEE Intelligent Systems· 0 citations
It is argued that agent security must be evaluated under an untrusted-model assumption: a correct system is one in which a fully prompt-injected agent still cannot exceed the authority explicitly delegated to it, and an authorization broker is implemented that closes the gap.
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