A four-stage forensic audit protocol for API-served models, validated prospectively on a flagship case whose 2026-08-23 analysis pointed to the GLM-5.3 version line and whose official reveal confirmed those family and version-line inferences.
Abstract
The 2025--2026 AI market has seen a wave of stealth releases: frontier models launched anonymously on developer platforms under codenames. For their users, identity determines data-handling terms, supply-chain risk, and capability expectations. No validated methodology exists for black-box identity verification of anonymous models: practitioner checklists lack accuracy evidence, and self-identification is untrustworthy by design. We propose a four-stage forensic audit protocol for API-served models. Stage 0 reconstructs launch-time configuration from archived platform snapshots (Internet Archive), exposing preview--production drift. Stage 1 fingerprints configuration (context, output ceiling, reasoning, modality) against the platform catalog. Stage 2 tests tokenizer identity with a cross-length differential that rejects short-prompt collisions. Stage 3 corroborates with behavioral probes. We test declaration consistency on 10 known-identity releases (7 exact, 2 precision-differences, 1 partial, 0 counter-directional), not end-to-end identification under anonymity. Identification is validated prospectively on a flagship case whose 2026-08-23 analysis pointed to the GLM-5.3 version line and whose official reveal confirmed those family and version-line inferences (deployment variant was not pre-asserted; Flash was consistent post-reveal), and on three Stage-0-only cases where the protocol produced a graded hypothesis or declined rather than guessed. A standard-library-only implementation is provided as supplementary material.
TP-CRIV targets a third-party verification setting in which the verifier has neither white-box nor API access to the claimant's model, can interact with the suspicious deployed service only through its ordinary black-box inference interface, and does not require protocol-specific cooperation from the service provider.
TCF (Targeted Counterfactual Fingerprinting), a black-box LLM fingerprinting framework that converts open-ended generation comparison into constrained-answer targeted counterfactual transfer, and introduces the source-model counterfactual margin (SCM), a protected-model-only quantity that certifies the target is unlike...
Yu-Tong Wu, Xiao-Fan Bai, Shixin Li et al.· 1 citation
Under the single-shot, raw-bytecode-only protocol, current LLMs are not reliable standalone forensic tools, and their robustness has not been systematically tested against contracts adversarially designed to mislead analysis.
Privacy exposure displacement, the mismatch between a local evaluation proxy and target-grounded session exposure, and ASLEval, an authorization-aware framework that pre-registers a hidden target set, measures all declared visible exits, and reserves internal traces for diagnosis are introduced.
Guo-Xin Wu, Hui-Zhen Huang, Guo-Xiong Long et al.· 0 citations
The results support a narrow conclusion: the verifier changes what the system ships, while deterministic code supplies enforcement and auditability; they do not establish superiority to other agents or generalization beyond lab targets.
A layered system model and an analysis pipeline that uses prior history as the temporal baseline, applies cumulative pruning and cross-proof propagation to each proof's Commitment Set, and recursively traces the survivors through historical hidden-state transitions to derive the final transaction-level Anonymity Set Si...
Hanze Guo, Stefanos Chaliasos, Ye-Bo Feng et al.· 0 citations