Skip to content
Log in

Similar papers

Open access Jul 2026

Standing Your Ground on Moral Disagreement

Moral disagreement is often invoked to support skeptical conclusions about moral judgment, typically by modeling it on the epistemology of peer disagreement. On the dominant picture, disagreement with a peer supplies higher‐order evidence of error and thereby rationally requires suspension of judgment or a substantial reduction in confidence. We argue that this evidential picture is problematic, especially in the moral domain. First, the conditions for epistemic peerhood are difficult to specify and apply without arbitrariness, and this undermines the assumption that disagreement is a uniform sign of error. Second, even where peerhood conditions are plausible, moral disagreement need not play the specific evidential role presupposed by the skeptical argument. Drawing on resources from social epistemology, we develop an alternative framework on which persistent moral disagreement can function as a structured form of collective inquiry, regulated by argumentative practices and epistemic institutions. On this view, steadfastness is not automatically a sign of epistemic arrogance; under appropriate conditions, it is compatible with epistemic humility, and it can contribute to both epistemic and moral improvement.

Mario Gensollen, Marc Jiménez‐Rolland, Alejandro Mosqueda · 0 citations
Aug 2026

Nonnaturalism and the Ineffability of Moral Normativity

Metaethical nonnaturalists claim that rival theories fail to capture the special kind of normativity that morality seems to possess. Yet, they struggle to articulate an account of moral normativity that makes clear what the naturalist is missing. While some philosophers take this struggle to show that the nonnaturalist’s notion of normativity is illusory, I argue that a more benign explanation is available that fits well with the general tenor of nonnaturalism and that explains a number of puzzling observations about the state of the metaethical debate. This explanation is that morality’s normativity is ineffable. I also argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, my strategy for redeeming the nonnaturalist does not commit her to the quietist view that nothing sensible can be said about moral normativity. While the ineffability of moral normativity precludes an informative literal characterization, there remains the possibility of using metaphors to communicate usefully about moral normativity.

Lucia Schwarz · 0 citations
Aug 2026

Moral Universalism and Pluralism of Values: Revisiting Habermas’s Theory of Discourse Ethics

The concept of universalization is one of the most problematic and controversial among those pertaining to Jürgen Habermas’s theory of discourse ethics. As some critics have argued, Habermas’s requirement that moral disagreements be resolved through the identification or institution of a commonly shared interest on the basis of which to establish a universal agreement on the validity of the normative claims aimed at its satisfaction is unrealistic given the inherently pluralistic conditions in which these disagreements tend to manifest themselves. Some have pointed out that the fulfillment of such a requirement could be highly pernicious due to the homogenizing, paternalistic, and even totalitarian attitudes and practices to which this could potentially give rise. Contrary to these criticisms, this article argues that moral universalism—in the particular way in which Habermas conceives of it—and the existence of a pluralism of values are not only compatible but also, in fact, interdependent achievements.

Belén Pueyo-Ibáñez · 0 citations
Open access

From Biology to Normativity

The genesis of morality has remained a subject of perennial debate, and philosophers have yielded variegated and irreconcilable accounts regarding its origins and application. The argument has been between rationalist-transcendental approaches (e.g., Plato, Kant) and naturalist-evolutionary accounts (e.g., Hume, Darwin). The former derive universal, objective and absolute moral principles from articulated rational theories, and de-emphasise the factors of empirical and biological conditions of human life upon ethical discourse. However, evolutionary ethics establishes a descriptive or biological account of our natural moral capacity, and never treats it as an external imposition or as pure rational discovery. Yet such a natural account of morality is challenged (as Hume, Moore and Street noticed) to corroborate how normative authority can be derived from biological and experiential origins. Unless this gap is resolved, we remain caught between the extremes of “ethical absolutism”, which maximises abstract normativity, and a “biological reductionism” that reduces complex moral reasoning to biochemical or genetic facts. Thus, I contend that the fact-value dichotomy, the biological reductionism and the moral absolutism or essentialism can be reconciled through the synthesis of evolutionary ethics and Deweyan pragmatism. Against the two extreme views, Dewey’s ethical inquiry (characterised by its experimental, practical, and context-sensitive nature) can provide normative justification for evolutionary ethics. Accepting the biological origins of morality and treating moral judgment as a problem-solving tool, Dewey proposes pragmatic alternatives that transform natural capacities into normative authority. Methodologically, I follow a critical-analytical approach and combine philosophical exegesis with conceptual reconstruction. Through engaging with key thinkers (Dewey, Darwin, Dawkins, De Waal, and Churchland), comparative analyses, and integrative argumentation, I construct a systematic account of moral origins and growth that is both empirically grounded and normatively strong.

Yikunoamlak Mesfin Alemu · 0 citations
Open access Jul 2026

A Will to Interpret: Embodied Moral Reflexivity Under Misrecognition

This article reinterprets Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice as a framework for understanding the moral struggles of marginalised actors in everyday contexts. Growing scholarship has emphasised that moral practices encompass not only intentional and deliberative reasoning but also automatic, instant and embodied reactions. Building on this literature, this article demonstrates how morality, as moral habitus and embodied dispositions, can subtly influence the dominant morals and norms throughout individual negotiations with habitus. In particular, it reframes Bourdieu's notion of practical reflection as a will to interpret —a pre‐reflective, practically oriented process of moral orientation that arises from embodied dissonance under conditions of misrecognition. Based on this concept, the article identifies two key sites where Bourdieu's theory contributes to moral struggles: (a) the experiential gap produced by hysteresis and (b) the development of new moral languages among marginalised actors. Ultimately, it calls for greater attention to the subtle, slow and often unnoticeable forms of resistance that unfold in everyday life, quietly reshaping moral landscapes from within.

Junghun Oh · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

O bom, o mau e o neutro

The present article presents and discusses the foundations of the New Moral Realism proposed by Markus Gabriel in Ethics for Dark Times (2020), a work that extends his New Realism project into the field of ethics. Starting from a metaethical defense of moral realism, Gabriel argues that there are objective moral facts, independent of individual or cultural opinions, yet accessible to human reason and recognizable across all societies. The article examines the three central theses of his system — Realism, Humanism, and Universalism — and his opposition to relativism, pluralism, and nihilism. Gabriel’s critique of “postmodern cynicism” and the contemporary crisis of truth is analyzed in contrast with authors such as Bruno Latour and Friedrich Nietzsche. It is argued that overcoming relativism and nihilism is a necessary condition for global moral progress, which must be understood as a collective endeavor of humanity. Through the recognition of universal moral facts — such as the condemnation of evidently evil practices, like torture for amusement — Gabriel proposes a New Enlightenment that unites reason and morality in response to the ethical challenges of the 21st century, such as nationalism, ecological collapse, and global inequalities. The article concludes that New Moral Realism offers a robust alternative to moral pessimism and cultural fragmentation, affirming the objectivity of ethics without appealing to theological foundations.

Matheus Benites · 0 citations