This work describes simple processes of evolution that have the astonishing ability of driving direct reciprocity to maximum payoff in all social dilemmas which it finds leads to communities of strategies that reach maximum payoff in Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift, Stag Hunt and Harmony games.
Abstract
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions between the same individuals. Direct reciprocity can help natural selection to favor cooperators over defectors, but whether or not cooperation prevails depends on the details of the evolutionary dynamics. We describe simple processes of evolution that have the astonishing ability of driving direct reciprocity to maximum payoff in all social dilemmas which we study. The basic process is based on mutation and pairwise comparison. Mutation samples strategies near the boundary of the strategy space. Pairwise comparison includes a parameter for intensity of selection. For large population sizes, intermediate to high mutation rates and intermediate to strong intensities of selection, we find that the process leads to communities of strategies that reach maximum payoff in Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift, Stag Hunt and Harmony games. Maximum payoff in all four games is consistently achieved if players have access to memory-2 strategies. Memory-1 strategies have the capacity to resolve all four social dilemmas, but they are usually defeated by a ``Hold-trap''in Snowdrift games.
Direct reciprocity, a mechanism for evolution of cooperation, rests on a promise of the future: that the cost of cooperation will be returned in subsequent encounters. Whether reciprocity works is often asked as a question about evolutionary stability: can a population of cooperators resist invasion by mutants that def...
Costly cooperation and the evolution of costly signals are both difficult to reconcile with simple fitness maximization, yet both are common in biological and social systems. We study a model in which agents emit costly signals and condition their actions on the signals they observe. The signals are arbitrary, non-cost...
Mahdiah Abolhasani, Saman Moghimi-Araghi, Mohammad Salahshour· Frontiers in Ethology· 0 citations
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is the canonical model in microeconomics for the tension between individual rationality and collective welfare. Standard game-theoretic analysis predicts that mutual defection is the unique Nash equilibrium, despite being Pareto-dominated by mutual cooperation. This study revisits the Prisoner’s...
Aras Yolusever· Alınteri Sosyal Bilimler Der...· 0 citations
Autopoietic Game Theory is introduced, a computational model where social interactions, replication mechanisms, and their associated computational costs are endogenous and simultaneously co-evolving and can incorporate exogenous pressures.
Kunal Jha, F. Cicala, B. A. Y. Arcas et al.· 0 citations
The theoretical analysis reveals that coupling a social dilemma layer to a non-dilemmatic constant-selection layer robustly enhances cooperation in many cases, across different multilayer networks, updating rules, and payoff schemes.
Human cooperation unfolds in social environments where individuals influence each other through payoff-based learning and social comparison, the tendency to evaluate fitness relative to others. However, it is still unclear how social comparison and population structure jointly shape cooperation. Here, we incorporate so...
Xiao-Jin Xiong, Qin Li, J. Kurths et al.· Communications Physics· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.