The article proposes an approach that remains largely unexplored in the international literature: interpreting plant genetic engineering through the lens of Jonasian ontology of life and the ethics of responsibility, thereby moving the debate beyond the limits of traditional anthropocentrism.
Abstract
The central argument of this article is that the genetic manipulation of plants raises profound ethical questions that cannot be adequately addressed within a purely anthropocentric framework. Drawing on Hans Jonas’s philosophy of responsibility, the article argues that modern biotechnology transforms living organisms into objects of technological intervention, thereby challenging traditional distinctions between subject and object in the domain of technology. Because plants are living beings that possess their own intrinsic good and play a fundamental role in the biosphere, their genetic manipulation must be evaluated not only in terms of human utility but also in relation to ecological integrity, intergenerational responsibility, and the preservation of life’s evolutionary continuity. The article proposes an approach that remains largely unexplored in the international literature: interpreting plant genetic engineering through the lens of Jonasian ontology of life and the ethics of responsibility, thereby moving the debate beyond the limits of traditional anthropocentrism.
A unified theoretical framework formalised by the conceptual equation A + B = 1, where A represents human biological inheritance and B represents dynamic cultural systems is introduced, which establishes a rigorous guardrail against both biological determinism and radical cultural blank-slate models.
R. Khongsdier· International Journal for Sc...· 0 citations
This paper aims to analyse the implications of technology of gene editing on the scope and meaning of the legal concept of the heritage of humanity in the context of the wider phenomenon of the Anthropocene. Therefore, the objectives of this paper are two-fold; first, does the concept of heritage of humanity allow gene editing to modify this heritage? Secondly, given that humans can modify not just the human genome, but genomes of other life using the new gene editing technologies, how should non-human genetic manipulation on larger and faster scales be governed? This paper uses the doctrinal research method to investigate international bio-law using interdisciplinary concepts from earth systems science. The analysis draws attention to the weak framework of existing international law, and the acceleration of the Anthropocene biosphere, which in turn pushes the earth out of the safe operating zone. This paper calls for regulating gene editing through an international policy and legal framework for novel entities, rethinking the concept of the ‘heritage of humanity’ as going beyond the human genome.
The article examines the philosophical and legal issues arising in connection with the development of transhumanism - an intellectual and socio-political movement that advocates the radical improvement of human abilities through technology. The rapid technological progress of the 21st century actualizes the problem of the immutability of man as a subject of law and calls into question the traditional principles of legal regulation of fundamental human rights in conditions when the boundary between man and machine is becoming increasingly conditional.
This article offers a comprehensive philosophical and legal analysis of transhumanism in the context of the contemporary human rights framework. Transhumanism, understood as an intellectual and socio-political movement advocating the radical enhancement of human physical and cognitive capacities through technology, poses fundamentally new challenges for legal science: whether the concept of human dignity is preserved when an individual voluntarily transcends the boundaries of biological human nature; how constitutional rights, formed within an anthropocentric paradigm, can regulate relations between technologically enhanced and non-enhanced persons; and whether the right to morphological freedom constitutes a form of constitutional liberty. The article investigates the debate between transhumanists and bioconservatives regarding the permissibility of biotechnological intervention in human nature, as well as the natural law position in these disputes. Particular attention is devoted to the emergence of new human rights in response to neurotechnology-related threats and the critical evaluation of the neurorights concept. A key new dimension of the study is the analysis of the relationship between transhumanism and the principle of equality: technological human enhancement may generate a «technological inequality» that differs fundamentally from traditional forms of inequality, as it entrenches advantages not only in the social but also in the biological dimension. The article demonstrates that transhumanism does not negate human rights but rather transforms their content, requiring constitutional law to update its normative framework to account for new anthropological realities.
A. Kregul· Analytical and Comparative J...· 0 citations
This article examines transhumanism as an intellectual and cultural movement aimed at overcoming human biological limitations through technology. It analyzes the term's evolution from mid-20th-century futurological concepts to contemporary philosophical discourse. Particular attention is paid to the concept of «posthumanity» as a hypothetical stage of evolution characterized by a radical break with anthropological constants. The author explores key ethical dilemmas: identity, social inequality, ontological security, and the redefinition of human nature.Based on a comparative analysis of the works of N. Bostrom, F. Fukuyama, D. Haraway, and R. Bray, the author concludes that a normative framework for regulating human enhancement technologies is necessary.
V. V. Chernyshenko· Abyss (Studies in Philosophy...· 0 citations
