Modern agent frameworks allow users to provide Markdown files containing system prompts, tool descriptions, and skill definitions (e.g., SKILL.md), which are incorporated into the agent's context during initialization. In this work, we investigate whether this configuration mechanism can also serve as an injection chan...
Agent skills, reusable instruction packages centred on a SKILL.md file, extend AI agents on demand, and a single line in a widely copied skill reaches every agent that loads it. Some lines are oversight-loosening directives: they tell the agent to proceed without approval, to bypass checks with --no-verify, or to keep...
Modern image generators can produce complex visual artifacts, including diagrams, interfaces, and records that combine text, graphics, and layout to convey detailed information. They may refuse requests for overtly harmful imagery yet still generate artifacts that guide dangerous actions or support deception. We call t...
Zi-Hao Zhu, Yuansan Liu, Siwei Lyu et al.· 0 citations
Scalable oversight asks how a weak verifier can check the outputs of computations performed by more powerful AI systems. One proposed approach uses relativizing interactive proofs, in which a weak verifier checks the output of a complex oracle-aided computation by interacting with one or more powerful provers. A promin...
Zi-Yi Guan, Y. Kalai, Ron D. Rothblum et al.· 0 citations
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It is found that the relationship between federation and explanation quality is non-monotonic: at near-IID and moderate heterogeneity, federated models match or exceed the faithfulness of a centralized baseline, but at extreme heterogeneity, explanations break down entirely, becoming spatially incoherent and, on averag...
This work provides the first systematic characterization for the effectiveness of different injection placements, spanning both coarse-grained environmental surfaces and fine-grained positions, and develops learning-based attackers that generate injection content and select better injection placements.
Cheng-Quan Guo, Xiao-Dong Liu, Wei-Wei Yang et al.· 0 citations
It is shown that an I-HITL protocol requires a trusted entity - a trusted computing device (or equivalent) - and characterize which such devices can and cannot realize an I-HITL protocol.
Samuel Breckenridge, Dani Vilardell, Wen-Hao Wang et al.· 0 citations
Web services increasingly expose backend interfaces that let users delegate tasks to AI agents, which invoke service operations directly without navigating websites. This shift changes how existing Web vulnerabilities can be exploited. We investigate these changes through VELA, an executable benchmark covering 44 vulne...
Ruozhao Yang, Jiongchi Yu, Ming Hu et al.· 0 citations
Unsafe deserialization turns untrusted data into attacker-controlled execution, and a single vulnerability can admit diverse exploit variants that evade defenses tailored to a known exploit. Existing defenses typically operate at a single enforcement point with limited visibility into the full attack. Combining control...
Ruo-Zhao Yang, Ming-Lang Li, Jiongchi Yu et al.· 0 citations
In open large language model (LLM) ecosystems, models are frequently adapted across multiple domains and applications, forming multi-stage derivation chains. Consequently, tracking and verifying historical contributions is essential for model provenance and intellectual property protection. However, existing watermarki...
Tool-augmented large language model (LLM) agents aggregate dialogue history, tool outputs, and retrieved content into an accumulated runtime state to complete multi-step tasks. This execution model exposes agents to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, in which attacker-controlled instructions embedded in external...
Tian Zhang, Yiwei Xu, Juan Wang et al.· 0 citations
Experimental results demonstrate that SELF maintains high IP infringement detection accuracy while significantly outperforming state-of-the-art baselines in reducing false positives and showing strong robustness against various downstream modifications, including quantization, pruning, and fine-tuning attacks.
Research Manager Mike Walker reflects on a career spanning hacker culture, cybersecurity, and AI, sharing lessons about trust, teamwork, leadership, and why solving difficult problems requires curiosity, judgment, agility—and an understanding of the rules. The post Learn the rules: The hacker mindset appeared first on Microsoft Research.
Critical flaws, compromised release channels and agentic AI threats landed within days of each other in mid-October 2026. Why “Black October” may say more about how well we now find weaknesses than about the attacks themselves. The post Black October? The Week AI Changed the Cybersecurity Conversation appeared first on GPT-Lab.